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THE CONSTITUTION VERSUS THE COURT: SOME
THOUGHTS ON HILLS ON AMAR
Akhil Reed Amar'
Professor Roderick M. Hills, Jr. enjoys a well-deserved reputation for
brilliance and generosity, and both traits are prominently displayed in his
recent review of my book, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruc-
tion,1 in the pages of the Northwestern University Law Review.2 Hills's re-
view essay bristles with interesting, important, and imaginative insights
across a broad range of issues. He blends these brilliant insights with a very
generous attitude towards the book and its author. In particular, his detailed
account of the book's central argument is as sympathetic and charitable as I
could have ever hoped for. For that generosity, I am truly grateful. Hills's
essay is also very generous towards the Supreme Court. But I wonder
whether it may be too generous. For Hills's generosity towards the Court
requires Hills to be less than generous-and at times less than correct-
towards the Constitution itself. Hills suggests that to the extent the Court
has deviated from the Constitution, the deviations may have been necessary
to correct defects in the Constitution itself. It seems to me, however, that
the Constitution is more attractive than Hills admits, and the caselaw less at-
tractive-at least in the three areas that Hills highlights: voting rights, jury
rights, and expression rights.
I. THE CONSTITUTION VERSUS THE COURT: IN GENERAL
Before turning to the three specific domains Hills identifies, let us
briefly review a few of his general claims. According to Hills: my book
tends to emphasize "text, structure, and original understanding" while pay-
ing less attention to "judicial precedent." As a result, I "cannot account for"
certain important Supreme Court cases, including cases dealing with the
right to vote and the right to be free from racially stacked juries. I lack a
"meta-theory" to resolve the question of how much weight text, history, and
structure deserve when they conflict with judicial precedent. And in par-
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ticular, I do not fully acknowledge the degree to which the "'reconstruction'
of the Bill of Rights by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment was a
failure as a matter of policy."3
Hills himself thinks that caselaw-even (or especially) when it departs
from constitutional text and enactment history--deserves more credit than I
give'it:
Precedents, judicial and political, represent our collective experience of trying
to apply constitutional rules handed down to us. If those precedents depart
from the values and beliefs underlying the rules, then this might be a sign that
the beliefs and values of the framers were internally inconsistent or practically
unworkable. It is possible that courts have had to disregard (parts of) the ide-
ology underlying the rules in order to make the rules themselves practically ef-
fective or intellectually coherent 4
I plead guilty to some of H-ills's charges. My book does indeed focus con-
siderable attention on, and is largely organized around, constitutional text.
For example, rather than discussing modem Bill of Rights cases in chrono-
logical order, I try to discuss Amendments I-X, and then XIV, in textual or-
der. And within each discussion, I do indeed highlight textual points-
small details and larger patterns-and try to place these points in the
context of the political and social history surrounding the enactment of
these amendments. As shall become clear below, and as I say explicitly in
the Afterword to my book, I do not think that constitutional text is the only
thing that matters. But I do think that constitutional textualism can be
illuminating and normatively attractive, for reasons that I briefly mentioned
in the book and that I shall touch on in my remarks below. (In future work,
I hope to elaborate the attractions and limitations of constitutional
textualism in much greater detail.)
6
Also, I plead guilty to lacking a "meta-theory," if by that we mean a
normatively attractive and mathematically precise interpretive algorithm for
interpreting the Constitution. But does any constitutional scholar now
writing have such a "meta-theory"? (Does Professor Hills?) Any approach
that treats one methodology as absolutely lexically prior to others-e.g.,
text comes first, and other things (history, precedent, practical conse-
quences) come into play only if text is strictly in equipoise-seems hard to
defend. For example, most committed textualists that I know think that if
interpretation A seems ever so slightly more textually supportable than in-
3 Id. at980.
4 Id. at 992.
5 AMAR, supra note 1, at 295-307.
6 Eventually, I hope to write a book on the topic of constitutional textualism-its attractions, its limita-
tions, its puzzles and challenges, and its variations. For illustrations of my current thinking on this issue, see
Akll Reed Amar, A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalilm, Teualrism, and Populism, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
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terpretation B, B might still be a better reading overall if strongly supported
by the weight of history, precedent, common sense, and so on. And any ef-
fort short of lexical ordering that seeks to assign precise weights to various
modes of interpretation-text counts forty percent, enactment history
twenty percent, precedent twenty percent, and so on-seems obviously
doomed by the lack of standard weights and measures. (How do we decide
whether reading A is ten percent or thirty percent more textually plausible
than reading B, which is seventeen percent-or is twenty-seven percent?-
more historically sound?) More generally, good interpretation tries to
achieve a kind of reflective equilibrium among the initial readings gener-
ated by different interpretive methodologies. If my textual argument seems
dramatically contrary to my historical evidence, this may be a sign that per-
haps I have gone wrong somewhere along the road, that I need to take an-
other look at the text, or reinvestigate the history. The relationship among
modalities is not additive but synergistic-each helps me to see the others
in a fresh light. Sound interpretation does not merely tote up text, history,
precedent, and so on, but tries to make these fit together in some coherent
and holistic way.
In my book, I aimed to offer an interpretation of the Constitution's text
and history that, in general, cohered with modem judicial caselaw. Because
I thought I had generally succeeded in this ambition, I did not discuss in
detail what should give when text and precedent were wholly at odds. But I
did suggest in the Afterword to my book that-at least where the Bill of
Rights was concerned-the text and history were often more normatively at-
tractive than the corresponding caselaw over the years. If incorporation of
the Bill of Rights is textually and historically sound, as I suggest, then cur-
rent caselaw is indeed right-and so I am not forced to choose between
them. But if current caselaw is right, then older caselaw rejecting incorpo-
ration is wrong. This is an inescapable implication of modem caselaw, al-
though a lesson that modem judges have, for understandable reasons,
chosen not to shout from the rooftops. 7 The Court gave us incorporation
over the course of the twentieth century, whereas constitutional text and
history (on my account-and on the modem Court's too!) gave us incorpo-
ration in 1868. If incorporation is right and good, as the modem Court in-
sists (and I agree), then the Justices owe Americans an apology for not
enforcing the true meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment for so many years.
7 Modem judges have overruled earlier cases, and have based their modem rulings on the Four-
teenth Amendment itself. They have not argued, il la Bruce Ackerman, that some unwritten amendment
occurred in 1925 that made expression rights thenceforth applicable against states, or that in 1963 the
Constitution was again silently amended so as to incorporate criminal procedure rights thereafter. In-
stead, the Court has based incorporation on the Fourteenth Amendment itself, and the clear logic is thus
that the Court should have enforced these rights beginning in 1868 (even though in actual fact the Court
did not do so).
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On my reading, Brown8 and Bollin were right in 1954, but Plessy'0
was wrong in 1896-and here, too, the Court was less normatively attrac-
tive than the Constitution's text and enactment history. If New York Times
v. Sullivan 's11 vision of robust free speech for anti-governmental dissenters
is right-as the modem Court insists, and I agree-then Supreme Court Jus-
tices and lower federal judges were wrong to uphold the infamous Sedition
Act of 1798. Another example: due process at its (textual and historical)
core means fair courtroom prQcedures, and the infamous Fugitive Slave
Law of 1850 lacked such fair procedures. Yet the Taney Court upheld
rigged trials for alleged fugitive slaves at the same time that the Justices
proclaimed-ludicrously, from the perspective of text and enactment his-
tory-that free-soil laws like the Northwest Ordinance and the Missouri
Compromise were themselves unconstitutional infringements on the prop-
erty rights of slaveholders. One final example: the Fourteenth Amendment
was centrally drafted to protect underdogs like Southern blacks and dis-
senting speakers, but for much if not most of its existence, the Court used
the Amendment far more to protect overdogs like corporations and proper-
tied folk while offering less help to the core group of underdogs.
To summarize: on my view, the Constitution is more attractive, and
the Court less attractive, than many people (including Hills) seem to think.
Granted, this general statement is a bit too pat. The Constitution does not
speak for itself, and must be interpreted. But there is, I think, a well recog-
nized difference between interpretations that focus more on the document,
and interpretations that focus more on the evolving gloss of subsequent
caselaw. Those pursuing the first kind of constitutional interpretation-call
them "documentarians"--place special weight on the Constitution's words
(clause by clause and more holistically, with attention to word patterns, or-
ganization of articles and sections, and so on) and its enactment history
(read narrowly or understood more broadly). Those practicing the second
kind of constitutional interpretation-call them "caselawyers"--place more
weight on what the current Court is saying and what past Courts have said.
I tend to think that on the topics that I have studied, the Constitution as read
through a "documentarian" lens is more attractive than when read through a
"caselawyer" lens.
This is too large a claim to be defended in this small space; but Profes-
sor Hills offers a few useful test cases, involving voting rights, jury service,
and free expression. On each of these topics, I shall argue that the gap be-
tween my "documentarian" approach and a "caselawyer" approach is
smaller than Hills suggests. In general, my approach does account for the
great weight of current caselaw. But to the extent that the two approaches
8 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1952).
9 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1952).
10 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
11 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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diverge, I will suggest that the document may be better than the caselaw. Or
to be more personal and less anthropomorphic: the framers Hills disparages
may have been better than the judges he defends.
II. THE CONSTITUTION VERSUS THE COURT: IN PARTICULAR
A. Voting Rights
Let's start with Hills's discussion of voting rights. He notes that I
(along with many other scholars) emphasize that "the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment argued repeatedly that Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment would not protect political rights such as the right to vote."' 2
Thus, Hills argues, the Court's voting jurisprudence based on the Equal
Protection Clause-a jurisprudence that he generally applauds-cannot be
justified by documentarians. And, he observes, all this suggests the wisdom
of modem judges and the folly of Reconstruction framers. The Recon-
structors' "command not to enforce citizens' political rights,"' 3 had it been
faithfully followed by documentarian judges, would have undermined the
Reconstructors' own desired enforcement of other, nonpolitical rights. In
other words, truly effective civil rights often require political muscle, which
in turn may require direct protection of political rights like voting. The Re-
constructors' vision of rights was, in Hills's words, "institutionally anemic,
relying on a handful of institutions-Article III courts, the Union Army,
and the Freedmen's Bureau-to enforce national rights., 14 And so, Hills
concludes, "[i]f the Reconstruction generation would not have endorsed
Reynolds v. Sims, then so much the worse for them."'5 And, presumably, so
much the better for wise modem judges!
I think Hills may have things backward. First, let's distinguish be-
tween "Section 1" of the Fourteenth Amendment and (in increasing order of
generality) the Fourteenth Amendment in its entirety, the Reconstruction
Amendments in their entirety, and the Constitutional text in its entirety.
Yes, Section 1 was not about political rights-but Section 2 of the Amend-
ment was. And this section would have enforced rights structurally and in
an institutionally savvy way-by reducing congressional representation for
any states that disenfranchised blacks directly or used some subterfuge to
keep blacks from voting in large numbers. Yet Section 2 was basically ignored
by later generations. And the Supreme Court should bear some of the blame,
for not making vigorous efforts to take this part of the document seriously.
Now focus on another part of the Fourteenth Amendment where the
Supreme Court has even more blood on its hands: Section 5. Contrary to
12 Hills, supra note 2, at 993.
'" Id. at 1000.
14 Id. at 997.
'5 Id. at 996.
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Hills's suggestion, the framers of the Amendment did not merely rely on
the (presumably weak) federal judiciary, and the (presumably temporary)
Union Army and Freedmen's Bureau. The Reconstructors also explicitly
empowered a politically powerful and permanent institution-Congress--to
"enforce" the values of liberty and equality at the heart of Section 1. (And
note that the Congress they sought to empower would, under Section 2, be
one that emphatically would not give special clout to all-white Southern
electorates; although this is exactly what later happened with barely a peep
from the Supreme Court.) But Section 5 was basically neutered by-you
guessed it-the Supreme Court itself, which has repeatedly refused to ac-
cept the broad power the document gives Congress to help vindicate the
rights of blacks and other civil rights claimants. From the infamous Civil
Rights Cases of 18836 to the unfortunate Boerne decision of 1997,"v it has
been the Supreme Court that has rendered the Fourteenth Amendment more
institutionally anemic than its framers intended.'8 So here Hills's story is
upside down: the document is better than the caselaw.
So far, we have focused only on the Fourteenth Amendment. But the
richness of the Reconstruction framers' vision is also evident in the Thir-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments, both of which vest Congress with im-
portant enforcement powers, and the latter of which squarely addresses
political rights (as we shall see in more detail below).
Also, let's not forget the Republican Government Clause of Article IV,
which squarely aims to protect political rights like voting. Many of the Re-
construction Republicans who insisted that Section 1 did not protect voting
rights also insisted that the Republican Government Clause did protect
voting rights. 19 And so Hills, with due respect, misstates the matter when
he refers to the Fourteenth Amendment "framers' command not to enforce
citizens' political rights."20 There was no such command. Likewise he errs
when he alludes to "the framers' specific intent not to protect political
rights"21 and "the framers' intent not to regulate political rights outside the
context of the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. 2
There was no such intent, as both Section 2 of the Fourteenth and the Re-
publican Government Clause should make clear.
It remains to compare what caselawyer judges have done under the
Equal Protection Clause to what documentarians might have done under the
16 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
17 Flores v. City of Boeme, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
is For sharp criticism of Boerne, see Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 6, and materials cited
therein.
19 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty,
Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749 (1994)(discussing the docu-
mentarian meaning of this clause).
20 Hills, supra note 2, at 1000.
21 Id. at 998.
22 Id. at 1001.
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Republican Government Clause. A defender of caselawyers might at first
be tempted to dismiss the Republican Government Clause as nonjusticiable,
but of course this ploy would backfire. If and to the extent the clause is not
justiciable, this nonjusticiability has rather little to do with the text or en-
actment history of the clause, and rather a lot to do with caselaw that has
rather weak documentarian credentials. And so the failure of judges to
take seriously the full meaning of this great clause is yet another strike
against the caselawyer and a point in favor of the documentarian.
Let's consider how caselawyers and documentarians would think about
four important modem voting cases, and one hypothetical case. First, in
Baker v. Carr, the Court allowed an equal protection challenge to gross
malapportionment occurring in Tennessee.24 A documentarian would reach
the -same result by forthrightly relying on the Republican Government
Clause. Even under the most narrow documentarian reading, this clause
aims to prevent a state government from systematically flouting majority
rule. That was precisely what was happening in Tennessee. An entrenched
and grossly malapportioned legislature refused to reapportion itself; and the
state citizenry had no fair and easy way to redress this problem of en-
trenched minority rule contrary to the wishes of a majority of voters: ordi-
nary elections for state lawmakers were tainted by the very
malapportionment that opponents sought to change. As Justice Clark noted
in his concurring opinion, Tennessee did not allow voters to change the ap-
portionment via a statewide initiative that would count all votes equally.25
Second, consider Reynolds v. Sims, where the Court insisted that equal
protection principles required that all votes be weighted equally, and that
each district be the same size: one person, one vote. 6 A documentarian re-
lying on the Republican Government Clause might not be compelled to the
same result, but could easily embrace it. Indeed, some of Reynolds' most
famous language meshes perfectly with the core principles of the Republi-
can Government Clause:
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres .... Logically, in a soci-
ety ostensibly grounded on representative government, it would seem reason-
able that a majority of the people of a State could elect a majority of that
State's legislators. To conclude differently, and to sanction minority control of
state legislative bodies, would appear to deny majority rights .... 2 7
Admittedly, one argument for the result in Reynolds would be less available
to the documentarian: strict equality of votes would not be textually sup-
23 See generally AMAR, supra note 19.
24 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
25 See id. at 259.
26 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
27 Id. at 562, 565.
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ported by the word "equal" in "equal protection" because the relevant
clause (for a documentarian) would not derive from Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment at all.28 But another argument for the result in Reynolds
would have sufficed: plenary legislative power to create unequally sized
districts can lead to the kinds of systemic frustrations of majority will evi-
dent in Baker, and judges properly seeking to limit this plenary power
should use the clean rule of one-person, one-vote, a rule that is far more ju-
dicially manageable than most other conceivable tests.
One of Reynolds' companion cases, Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General As-
sembly, is also relevant here.29 In Lucas, the state electorate itself had ap-
proved the malapportionment that the Court nevertheless invalidated. A
documentarian approach might well diverge here-although not necessar-
ily. On one view, the electorate's endorsement should suffice to reassure
judges that no systemic frustration of majority rule was taking place in
Colorado so as to violate the Republican Government Clause (read in
documentarian fashion). On the other hand, what happens if the state elec-
torate changes its mind? Must voters affirmatively reauthorize the malap-
portionment every so often? If so, how often? What happens if voters in
some parts of the state vote themselves more than their fair share of appor-
tionment, and voters in less favored parts of the state object? (On the facts
of Lucas, it seems that a majority of every district supported the malappor-
tionment. But perhaps some residents of disfavored areas ended up not
voting because they knew that they lacked enough votes statewide, and
Colorado never made clear to them that their district alone had the authority
to veto the malapportionment.) The Court's ruling in Lucas sidestepped
some of these devilish questions, and it is possible to imagine a documen-
tarian concurring in this judgment for reasons of judicial manageability.
But even if my documentarian approach "cannot account" for Lucas, this is
hardly a major defect for my approach. Lucas is a rather small wrinkle in
the Baker-Reynolds line of cases. And more dramatic still, Hills's own pre-
vious work suggests that he may think that Lucas is indeed wrong! The
very reasons that a documentarian might dissent in Lucas are the reasons that
Hills himself has offered in his brilliant analysis, in an earlier article, of state-
wide initiatives seeking to impose term limits on federal representatives. 30 So
if Hills, in citing Lucas, has indeed identified a place where my documentarian
approach diverges from current caselaw, perhaps he should be the first to ap-
plaud the superior wisdom of the document as compared to the Court.
28 Cf Hills, supra note 2, at 995 n.64 ("I tend to agree with Professor Donald Regan that the textual
hook on which one hangs a judicial doctrine does not much matter, except to the extent that different
textual hooks may be shorthand for different bundles of constitutional doctrine.").
29 Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
30 See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., A Defense of State Constitutional Limits on Federal Con-
gressional Terms, 53 U. PrIT. L. REV. 97 (1991).
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Finally, consider another voting rights case that Hills mentions,
Kramer v. Union Free School District.31 The Court invalidated a state law
under which Mr. Kramer was ineligible to vote for local school board
members because he was not a parent, and he did not own or rent real prop-
erty in the school district. But Kramer did get to vote in New York state
elections on a fair and equal basis, and it was the state legislature's rules
that he was challenging. How, Hills asks, was the treatment of Kramer a
violation of the basic ethos of the Republican Government Clause? One
answer is that the local voting rule was arguably wealth-based: had Kramer
bought a house he could have voted. And the egalitarian ideals underlying
the Republican Government Clause-to say nothing of the Twenty-fourth
Amendment-are arguably offended when voting power is so explicitly
linked to wealth. On this documentarian analysis, however, the following
hypothetical New York law should be seen as very different from the law
struck down in Kramer. Imagine that New York lawmakers believe that
public schools should be well funded. State lawmakers have the power to
impose school taxes themselves, but they also believe in localism (and may
want to avoid being too openly linked with high taxes). State lawmakers
thus adopt a state law that only parents can vote for school boards and
school taxes. Parents, they hope and expect, will more likely vote for gen-
erous funding than would others. This law does not have the vicious class
featureof the law in Kramer. And because it came from the state itself, and
everyone-parent and nonparent-was eligible to vote in statewide elections,
it should not be seen as violative of Republican Government principles.
Thus this law might pass documentarian muster, even though it would be
struck down by a caselawyer judge following the literal language and logic
of Kramer. But-once again-to the extent that my (documentarian) ap-
proach might diverge from the current Court's on a minor wrinkle, I suspect
that Hills should find my approach more attractive, not less, given what he
has written elsewhere.
B. Jury Rights
A similar story can be told about jury rights. Just as Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not encompass voting rights, neither was it
drafted to encompass the right to jury service; this too, I suggest in my
book,32 was a political right widely understood as beyond the scope of Sec-
tion 1. The language of 'privileges" and "immunities" of "citizens" tracked
the language of Article IV, which had never been read to give, say, a Mas-
sachusetts citizen traveling through Virginia the right to vote in Virginia
elections or serve on Virginia juries. And the language of "equal protec-
tion" focused on "persons" as opposed to "citizens"--paradigrnatically
nonvoting aliens. Section 1, on a documentarian reading, thus sought to
31 Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
32 AMAR, supra note 1, at 216-18 & n.*, 260-61,271.
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guarantee the civil rights of all citizens-including women-such as the
rights to speak, worship, hold property, and be tried by properly composed
juries. But not the political right to serve on juries.
How, then, to explain a landmark case like Strauder v. West Virginia
that in some ways implicitly traded on the right of black men to serve on ju-
ries? 33  On my account, this case is best understood as implicating not
merely a Fourteenth Amendment right to be tried by a fair jury, but also a
Fifteenth Amendment right of blacks to serve on juries. The Fifteenth
Amendment, I suggest, protects the rights of blacks to vote on juries, just as
it protects their rights to vote for and in legislatures.34 Hills worries that
this reading "can distort precedent. Strauder is, not, after all, a Fifteenth
Amendment decision: it is rooted in the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."
3 S
But Strauder itself is a rather confused opinion, wavering between lan-
guage that emphasizes the right of the defendant and language that empha-
sizes the rights of excluded jurors. The most coherent way to understand
the case-especially in light of more recent caselaw developments-is, I
suggest, my way. If, because of the Fifteenth Amendment, the twelve men
who heard Strauder's case were not a constitutionally proper jury, then their
verdict obviously also violated his own Fourteenth Amendment right to be
tried by a proper jury (just as if he had been tried by five ordinary citizens
calling themselves a lawful jury, or a panel of twelve permanent govern-
ment bureaucrats calling themselves a jury). The Fifteenth Amendment is
necessary to the analysis but not the end of it. And a Fifteenth Amendment
analysis beautifully coheres with the language of more recent cases. For
example, .in one of its most recent decisions, the Court has written the fol-
lowing:
[W]ith the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege
of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the demo-
cratic process .... "Whether jury service be deemed a right, or a privilege, or a
duty, the State may no more extend it to some citizens and deny it to others on
racial grounds than it may invidiously discriminate in the offering and with-
holding of the elective franchise."
36
3 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
34 In this argument, I follow Vikam David Amar, Jury Service as a Political Right Akin to Voting,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (1995).
S Hills, supra note 2, at 998. Cf. id. at 995 n.64 (suggesting that ordinarily "the textual hook on
which one hangs a judicial doctrine does not much matter").
36 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,407-08 (1991) (quoting Carter v. Commission of Greene County,
396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970)). See Vilam David Amar, supra note 34 (discussing how modem caselaw
meshes with a Fifteenth Amendment approach).
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Although the Court did not explicitly cite the Fifteenth Amendment here,
such a citation would not have undercut the analysis in any way. It would
merely have added a bit more documentarian clarity and force to the point.37
On the issue of juries and race, a Fifteenth Amendment approach is far
superior to what the caselawyer's caselaw in fact gave us. Strauder did not
guarantee that blacks would have equal rights to sit on juries where whites
were defendants. But the Fifteenth Amendment did guarantee this, as did
Congress in an 1875 statute that I quoted38 and that Strauder ignored. If we
are truly serious about protecting the civil rights of blacks in nonanemic
ways, we must insist that states may not exclude blacks from juries (or from
the bench or the legislature for that matter) in cases where nonblacks are de-
fendants. (Imagine for example a case charging a white Klansman with the
murder of a black.) Today's caselaw protects the right of blacks to serve on
juries regardless of the race of the defendant-and indeed, over the objec-
tions of the defendant.39 But Strauder-with its confused language and
strong accent on the race of the defendant-does not unambiguously sup-
port this modem development. And so here, too, my documentarian read-
ing coheres perfectly with modem caselaw. And here, too, a documentarian
approach is more normatively attractive than a caselaw approach: the full
loaf offered by the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 and Congress in 1875 was
better than the half loaf offered by the Court in Strauder, and only recently
has the Court finally caught up to the Constitution.
And what about jury service outside the race context? Here, a docu-
mentarian emphasis on those other parts of the Constitution that do affirm
rights of political participation-the Republican Government Clause, and
the Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments-would
generally cohere with modem caselaw. Here, too, the Court has, if any-
thing, been running behind the Constitution itself. The Constitution af-
firmed women's equal political participation in 1919, and it took the Court
a full half century before it finally caught up and affirmed women's right to
vote on equal terms injuries.
40
C. Expression Rights
Hills ends his essay with an extremely interesting discussion of expres-
sion rights. In particular, Hills reminds us that even though we must protect
citizens' expression rights against states, we should not ignore the expres-
sion rights of states. And sometimes, there will be a tension between these
37 Cf. Hills, supra note 2, at 995 n.64 (quoted supra notes 28, 35).
38 AMARsupranote l,at273,390n.165.
39 See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); Powers, 499 U.S. at 400; Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
40 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
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rights, Hills suggests.41 Hills's fascinating and thoughtful discussion calls
to mind a case decided by the Court in early 1999, just as his review essay
was being published. Perhaps I am also drawn to this case because it comes
from the same state as Lucas-Colorado-and can in some ways be under-
stood as raising issues similar to Lucas, implicating the ability of a state
people to structure their own government in a certain way. But the Court-
employing an overly exuberant conception of the First Amendment-seems
to have missed the important issues of states' rights at stake, in just the way
Hills warns against.
The facts of Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation were
simple.42 Colorado law provided that when enough voters signed up in
support of a given state initiative proposal, it went on the statewide ballot.
Colorado regulated the process in several ways, and three particular regula-
tions came before the Court. First, the state sought to require that each sig-
nature-gatherer wear a badge identifying his or her name, and status as a
"paid" or "volunteer" worker. Second, each gatherer had to be a registered
voter in Colorado. Third, initiative proponents were obliged to disclose
monthly how much each gatherer was getting paid. The Tenth Circuit
struck down all three rules, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Gins-
burg wrote for a five-person majority, with Justice Thomas providing a
sixth vote in a separate opinion; Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor and Breyer dissented.
The majority reasoned as follows. The First Amendment (as applied to
states via the Fourteenth) explicitly protects the people's right to petition.
The Colorado regulations were an impermissible attempt to abridge this
right. "Circulating a petition is akin to distributing a handbill" and so the
badge requirement was squarely governed by a 1995 case where the Court
struck down an Ohio law banning the distribution of anonymous campaign
literature. Indeed, on this point, the Justices were unanimous-even the dis-
senters conceded that the name tags triggered and flunked strict scrutiny
applicable to regulations of core political expression. (The Justices also
agreed that a rule that required only the "paid" or "volunteer" label without
any names might present a different case.) The other two rules also flunked
strict scrutiny, according to the Court. Limiting signature-gatherers to regis-
tered voters unconstitutionally constricted the number of voices in the debate;
and the financial disclosure requirements in effect forced paid gatherers to
surrender the anonymity enjoyed by their volunteer counterparts.
At first blush, all this might seem plausible. But a closer look suggests
that the Court was way off target. The Colorado initiative process is not
about "petitions." It's about state lawmaking. Strictly speaking, the state
41 Hills, supra note 2, at 1002-07 (discussing Arkansas Educ. Television Program Comm'n v.
Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998) and National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998)).
42 In the discussion that follows, I borrow from an earlier essay for a nonacademic audience. See
Akhil Reed Amar, The Five-Legged DogAM. LAW., Sept. 1999, at 47.
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was not regulating or prohibiting "petitions" or "speech" at all. It was
merely saying that unless a given signature was collected in a certain way, it
would not count for purposes of the state initiative process. In other words,
anyone in Colorado has a right to petition to his heart's content-to do so
anonymously and with no disclosure, even if he is not a registered voter.
But he has no First Amendment right to insist that Colorado treat his peti-
tion as anything more than a handbill. Most importantly, Colorado was not
trying to treat a nonconforming signature as anything less than a handbill,
fully protected by the First Amendment. Colorado merely said that unless
its rules were followed, any signature gathered would be treated as a peti-
tion pure and simple-as wholly protected First Amendment expression.
To see the point another way, imagine that I go to Denver next week
and demand a right to vote for Mickey Mouse as governor. Surely Colo-
rado need not count my vote in the next election because (a) I am not a reg-
istered Colorado voter, (b) Mickey Mouse is not an eligible candidate, and
(c) the state may properly insist that all lawful ballots be cast on election
day, or pursuant to a carefully regulated absentee ballot system. In one
sense I can "vote" for Mickey-just watch me!-and the state would be
wrong to punish me. But the state has a perfect right not to count my vote.
The facts of Buckley are no different than my Mouse case. Alas, not a sin-
gle Justice came close to seeing this; only Justices O'Connor and Breyer
seemed to sense that the First Amendment label didn't quite fit, but they
tried to argue within the label rather than thrusting it aside.
I would argue, and I suspect Professor Hills might agree, that Buckley
was less about censorship and more about popular sovereignty and state
autonomy, than any of the Justices seemed to grasp. The Constitution,
rightly read, affirms the presumptive right of a state to govern itself-to de-
cide, for example, where to put its state capital, how to pick its judges,
when to elect its governors, and whether to adopt a unicameral or bicameral
legislature. And also whether to have an initiative process, and how to
structure that process. It's hard to claim Colorado's initiative screening
rules are too strict given that Colorado was free to ban initiatives altogether.
Granted, having set up an initiative system, Colorado cannot impose any
conditions it wants, however outrageous. It could not announce that it will
count only the signatures of white voters, or of Republicans, for example.
But the rules involved in Buckley were worlds apart from such extreme hy-
potheticals. Colorado citizens were just trying to maintain an initiative
system true to its populist roots, as a counterweight to the money that bulks
so unattractively in the war-chests of ordinary legislators.
If, as I suspect, Professor Hills might share my doubts about the analy-
sis of Buckley, there is a sobering lesson here. When judges-in this case,
unanimously-depart from the best understanding of the Constitution's text
and structure, it is not always because judges are smart and our document's
framers were confused. Sometimes, it is closer to the other way around.
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